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I. Introduction
According to Fortune Global 500 (top 500 of largest total sales revenue), the
number of companies from emerging markets accounted for 2 percent in 1995.
Forecasts claim that their share will approach 50 percent by 2025. This rapid
increase from emerging markets has already developed a significant presence that is
catching up with multinationals from advanced countries or overtaking them
(Cuervo­Cazurra, Newburry, and Park, 2016, p.xi). Several giant companies from
the US, EU and Japan are threatened by these emerging market multinationals.
Among them, Asian emerging market multinationals (AEMM) became
conspicuously outstanding in size and growth of revenue, profit, asset, and market
share and thus corporate value. Since the latter half of the 2000s the fierce rivalry
between AEMM and multinationals from advanced countries regarding both
products and services has received much attention not only from managers of big
companies but also from researchers.
This paper clarifies the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) made
by AEMM in terms of data analysis and event study in addition to employing a few
analytical frameworks for demonstrating advantageous and weak factors unique to
AEMM’s entry strategies.
Therefore, this paper plays a role in highlighting key characteristics of FDI
including an acquisition. Concretely, it aims to supplement a new perspective for
analyzing the best selection of entry strategies for AEMM from the viewpoint of
combining macro analysis such as home nation competitiveness with micro
competitiveness with regard to firm­specific advantage.
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From the 1980s to the first half of the 2000s, research focused on multinational
enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries moving toward less developed
(Buckley and Clegg, 1991) or developing countries.
In this research context, Buckley and Casson (1991, pp.31­32) criticized the
conventional economic theory working with traditional cross­section regressions, in
which total factor productivity approach for such a theory is employed, owing to
only limited success in explaining international differences in material economic
performance (as measured by per capita GNP). The authors advocated the
importance of factors such as entrepreneurial culture from technical and moral
aspects in the development of a nation and thus paid attention to differences in
education and training among countries that are commonly cited as useful
explanative factors. This comprehensive view seems to be consistent with the long
run economic success of a nation.
Since the latter half of the 2000s, researchers have tackled the new field of the
market entry strategies of MNEs from emerging countries or markets toward
developed countries (Agtmael, 2007; Dunning, Kim, and Park, 2008; Ramamurti,
and Singh, 2009). This new research direction seems to be divided into two parts.
The first part of this direction focuses on the competitive advantages and
weakness of MNEs from emerging countries like China and India, etc., while taking
their home country backgrounds into consideration (Ramamurti, and Singh, 2009;
Cuervo­Cazurra, Newburry, and Park, 2016).
The other part is to weigh the institutional approach so as to characterize a
home nation’s advantages and government policies to each nation’s multinationals
as well as a few lacking factors related with each home country’s environment
(Nölke, 2014).
For example, Grätz (2014) stresses the role of Russian government policies
toward Russian multinational companies (MNCs) in explaining the emergence of
Russian MNCs. Grätz clarifies that the Russian government neither formulated
formal policies to support MNCs nor developed appropriate government agencies
tasked with assisting foreign direct investment abroad. This tendency corresponds
with the general institutional weakness of the Russian state. More obviously
speaking, the government’s financial support for Russian companies venturing
abroad has been selective and accessible only to well­connected firms (Grätz, J.,
pp.93­95).
Let us observe the phenomena common to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China). The first is that these four countries have large domestic markets. Owing to
their size, such emerging market governments have a good negotiation position
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toward foreign investors and governments. Therefore, no “sellout” is necessary. That
is, state actors do not have to give in to the demands of foreign multinationals, but
may impose upon the latter to make them transfer innovative technologies to
domestic manufacturing. Moreover, the size of consumer demand in large domestic
markets allows for a certain isolation of companies from fluctuations on global
markets and also enables growth strategies based first and foremost on production
for domestic markets, and later for international expansion (Lu, Liu, and Wang,
2010, p.241).
Throughout this explanation about the role of market size in emerging market
countries like BRICs, either inward direct investment or outward direct investment
for the same countries is likely to be influenced by their domestic market sizes. At
the earlier stage of product life cycle, inward direct investment (IDI) from other
countries should be preferable to FDI from emerging countries, which leads to
setting a hypothesis in the next section.
When addressing why giant MNEs have easily arisen from BRICs, the best
solution to this challenging question is as follows: The size of an emerging domestic
market is based on a number of very specific institutional factors and
complementarities. For MNEs stemming from BRICs, these factors include long
term stability with regard to corporate governance and corporate finance, both of
which are necessary in order to pursue “catchup strategies” starting from a pursuing
home advantage strategy accompanied with low labor costs and an abundant supply
of workers, to finally a system of innovation transfer that is based on reverse
engineering (Nölke, 2014, pp.80­81).
As the countries whose domestic market is very large like BRICs seem to be
so attractive for MNEs from developed countries, however, that many MNEs want
to set up their subsidiaries inside these countries. As the density of MNEs from
developed countries increases in a host country, local firms face the potential loss of
their domestic market opportunities.
Nevertheless, BRICs share upper four biggest rank in the weight of both total
number of giant class MNEs and their total sales volume by the source countries for
emerging MNEs. The reasons for such phenomena can be explained by the
importance of domestic market size which enables local manufacturers to introduce
a mass production way which sharply reduces an average production cost in their
domestic facility. Thus, they can respond to any cheap offer price required by
foreign marketers and not only expand their market share in the world but also their
company name and product brand name becomes familiar to manufacturers,
distributers and consumers in the world. This market access right retained by some
BRICs companies results in a short way for them to become MNEs.
On the other hand, there is an opposite opinion that a large domestic market
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attracts MNEs from many countries into the market country and sooner or later
hinders local companies from manufacturing and selling goods as well as
developing new technology. That is why host governments in emerging countries
often impose several kinds of regulations on MNEs from other countries, and in
particular from advanced countries. In some cases, this kind of government­based
disadvantage of foreignness may arise from concerns about national security
(Cuervo­Cazurra, Newburry, and Park, 2016, pp.96­97).
Most politicians in a host country will not support MNE strategies that prevent
domestic firms from taking advantage of their growth opportunities and tend to
perceive foreign firms as a threat to national sovereignty. In this way, emerging
market country governments tend to regulate MNE business activities for the sake
of domestic firms. Such institutional regulations toward foreign­owned subsidiaries
often leave them strictly controlled by the host government, while domestic firms
have the opportunity to become an MNE itself under the government’s strong
support. Government favoritism includes practices such as export subsidy and tax
exemption for R&D inside the home country. For the most part of AEMM, without
this regulation and a variety of promotion policies, they might have not become
giant MNEs in the first place. In this context, the host government’s discriminative
policies toward MNEs and home country firms are surely supportive fundamentals
that bring forth MNEs from the home country. This starting point for AEMM
should not be ignored.
As a result of discussions pro and con regarding inward direct investment
(IDI), the Chinese and Indian governments in particular could attain close to perfect
levels in favor of home companies, viewing their past ownership control policy and
taxation system in addition to location policy targeting at foreign companies.
In this meaning, the attractiveness of domestic market size and the government
policy toward IDI and its control over subsidiaries located at China and India. That
is why in this paper, Chinese MNEs and Indian MNEs are chosen as representatives
of AEMM.
Throughout the main literature review, we noticed that an institutional approach
is so meaningful as to make us understand why home nation advantages which
foster multinationals from emerging countries can be easily comparable and thus the
analytical framework for exploring the determinants of entry strategies for these
MNEs can be set up in addition to test several hypotheses.
In particular, this paper pays attention to the introduction of two kinds of
competitive advantages, that is, the two helpful concepts of firm­specific advantage
and country­specific advantage (Rugman, 1981) in order to explain why AEMM can
set up subsidiaries abroad.
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III. Macro Analysis of the Determinants of FDI by AEMM
As the introduction in this paper shows, Buckley and Casson (1991) contribute
to grasping the systematic dynamism for promoting home country firms to become
MNEs in line with a comprehensive approach contrasted with a simple economic
model, in which an explanative power appears to be further augmented, while they
throw a skeptical view on cross section regressions analysis centered on inputting
only economic factors which are strong compositions of GDP.
In this section we contradict their view and employ a multiple regression
analysis judging from the speediest economic growth in their home countries to find
out what home economic factors directly relate with GDP and influence on the size
of FDI originated by AEMM.
Derived from the literature review etc., several hypotheses concerning the
relationships between several home country specific advantages of Asian emerging
market countries and FDI from such countries were derived from the literature
review, and are presented below.
The bigger size of domestic consumption volume favors IDI over FDI from
Asian emerging market countries (AEMCs). Thus, the below relationship appears.
H 1: High home country consumption volume inhibits FDI from AEMCs.
The export volume of goods from AEMCs directly demonstrates not only their
home country competitiveness but also their firm specific advantage. In sum, the
below hypothesis is rational.
H 2: High export volumes of goods from AEMCs is positively combined with FDI
from AEMCs.
Let the import surplus for AEMCs be a sign of weakness not only in foreign
trade competitiveness as a nation but also in its country firms’ international
competitiveness. Consequently, the below relationship is plausible.
H 3: High import volumes of goods for AEMCs compared to exports is negatively
combined with FDI from AEMCs.
As the literature survey illustrates, more aggressive government expenditure
contributes to actively supporting FDI from AEMCs as a result of filling up lacking
investment funds with subsidies paid by its government to AEMCs. Inferring from
these causes and effects, the below relationship is assumed to be established.
H 4: Government expenditure has a positive relationship with FDI from its nation.
The stock of FDI from AEMCs is taken solely as a dependent variable. The
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stock base of FDI is more useful than the flow base of FDI for the former actually
combines with real production volume abroad outside its home nation.
Independent variables are Domestic Consumption, Government Expenditure,
Export of goods, and Import of goods, which are usable to each of the four
hypotheses.
Multiple regression analysis can be employed as it is most effective for testing
the four hypotheses since most independent variables are also jointly GDP
composite variables.
In Table 1, the results of the statistical analyses are summarized. The results of
testing the four hypotheses are shown as below.
Hypothesis 1 is supported to have a strongly negative relationship between
home country consumption volume and FDI from AEMCs at less than 0.1%
significance level.
Hypothesis 2 is supported as export volume of goods from AEMCs is
positively combined with FDI from AEMCs at less than 1% significance level.
Hypothesis 3 is supported by a strongly negative impact of import volume of
goods for AEMCs on FDI from AEMCs at less than 0.1% significance level.
Hypothesis 4 is supported by the most overwhelmingly positive relationship
between government expenditure and FDI from its nation.
Shown on the above, all hypotheses can be meaningfully established following
the theoretical background.
Table 1 The Influencing Powers on the Stock of FDI from Asian Emerging Countries: Results
of Multiple Regression Analysis
model
Independent variables
Non­standardization coefficient Std coe.
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Data source: Euromonitor Passport, IMD World Competitiveness Rank. Objective countries: China,
India, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines. Survey years: 200～2014.
Note: This statistical analysis is done by T. Fujisawa utilizing SPSS.
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Each of AEMCs has similar characteristics as a result of the multiple regression
analysis. First, such an independent factor as domestic consumption volume is
relatively small compared to GDP. Second, each government expenditure tends to
be comparatively large for GDP size. Third, the export volume of goods is large on
the whole, although the import volume of goods is apt to be small relative to
exports.
These four factors influencing the FDI stock can be combined with each other.
Both the flow and stock of FDI tend to be increased by export competitiveness,
shown by (export volume―import volume), and also by the expansion of
government expenditure that leads to the growth of the domestic economy. In
conclusion from this regression analysis, the possibility of AEMC growth depends
on each home national government’s fiscal supportive policy toward home
companies in the first place and the strong export competitiveness of each home
nation in the second, except for the flow of FDI, as this flow directly accumulates
FDI stock.
These empirical fact findings are explained by theoretical meanings derived
from macro­economics. That is why the view presented by Buckley and Casson
(1991) might be in part ignored so far as the appearance of AEMCs is concerned.
Next, Table 2 shows the effect of dividing countries into higher
competitiveness countries (labelled as Rank 1) and lower ones (Rank 2) as derived
from National Competitiveness Rank Data. Rank 1 countries coincide with rich FDI
stock, while Rank 2 ones are true for less FDI stock.
In order to refine the results from Table 1, let us introduce Fisher’s linear
distinction function. Rank 1 countries have extraordinarily both a higher export and
a lower import orientation of goods than their Rank 2 counterparts. This tendency
supports the result of Table 1 and should stress the great role that exporting goods
Table 2 The Distinction of High FDI stock by Nation Competitiveness Rank based on Fisher
Linear Distinction Function
Coefficient of Functions Classified Competitiveness Rank 1 Competitiveness Rank 2
Domestic Consumption volume −1.874 E­5 −1.713 E­6
Export Volume of Goods 7.596 E­6 −5.913 E­5
Import Volume of Goods −2.296 E­5 4.821 E­5
Export Volume of Service 0.12 0.211
Stock of Inward Direct Investment 9.066 E­5 1.527 E­5
Constant ­3.914 ­8.726
Source) Data collection and statistical analysis were performed by T. Fujisawa.
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for an emerging country has combined with setting subsidiaries abroad. For the most
part, transferring managerial resources, including capital, might be a key element for
AEMCs.
Here there may be doubts regarding the level of managerial resources required
by AEMCs when transferring them to the foreign subsidiaries involved in host
countries.
Therefore, we need to turn our focus to a micro­level analysis.
IV. Micro Analysis on Chinese MNEs
Rugman, A. builds a persuasive framework for explaining the existence of
Chinese MNEs (Rugman,2009, p.59). This framework originated with his first
matrix framework comprised of firm­specific advantage (FSA) and country­specific
advantage (CSA) in explaining why internalization is preferred to externalization for
multinationals. FSA holds true for FDI, and the CSA true for licensing (Rugman,
1981).
Based on the two­dimension matrix presented by Rugman (2009), four types
entry modes are shown for AEMM including Chinese MNEs.
1. The First quadrant: The combination of Strong FSA and Strong CSA(home)
2. The Second quadrant: The combination of Strong FSA and Weak CSA
(home)
3. The Third quadrant: The combination of Weak FSA and Strong CSA(home)
4. The Fourth quadrant: The combination of Weak FSA and Weak CSA(home)
Following the suggestions as a result of Rugman’s consideration into his
framework (Rugman,2009, pp.50­53), let us see what entry mode is optimal for
Chinese MNEs by quadrant. A big group company which satisfies the strength in
both of FSA and CSA may be suitable to select this strategic option.
In the first quadrant, a variety of global strategies such as diversification and
conglomerate can be deployed by Chinese MNEs leveraged by both strong FSA and
CSA. The best production site may be China where various goods are manufactured
at large volume and exported around the world.
In the second quadrant, as Chinese MNEs hold strengths in marketing know­
how and customization methods, they tend to adopt a sort of differentiation strategy
even though CSA derived from their home country (China) is rather weak, which
has no relation to compete with their rivals in the world market. They had better
search for production sites outside China.
In the third quadrant, Chinese MNEs exert cost leadership. By fully taking this
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advantage, the commodity type of products whose product life cycle stage coincides
with mature phase (later phase) are manufactured a lot and sold at cheaper prices for
worldwide market. In this case, international production is promising and thus China
is one of the candidates as a production site.
In the fourth quadrant, they had better make a decision on divestment as soon
as possible because they do not have any chance for globalization.
Next, we turn to the possibility of Chinese MNEs and their decision­making
regarding M&A abroad. On the whole, they tend to lack sophisticated technology,
marketing skill and systematic management according to Rugman. On the other
hand, they typically have strong firm­specific advantages such as rich financial
resources along with home country specific advantages such as cheap, abundant
labor power for a relatively excellent capacity, assembly and open modular parts
adequate to mass production way combined with simplified product technology.
Leveraging their strong financial resources, Chinese MNEs can move to acquire
MNEs from advanced countries and then transfer home specific advantages to their
subsidiaries. Through M&A, Chinese MNEs can obtain and absorb high technology,
excellent marketing skills and management know­how so as to cover their weak
points. In this way, Chinese MNEs can accumulate learning effects and thus show
high performance after the M&A because the outside resources bought by M&A are
useful for Chinese MNEs to enter into other developed markets in terms of
exporting and FDI including M&A. Nowadays, extending a marketing channel in
the world and world­widely famous brand with long history since founded can be
often seen for the case of Chinese M&A.
In this meaning Rugman’s unique analytical framework lends itself to explain
the determinants of overseas M&A developed by Chinese MNEs, mainly in
developed countries.
About ten years have passed since Rugman proposed this line of research.
Previously, Chinese MNEs enlarged their share in world commodity product
markets at the mature stage of international product life cycles in terms of home
production and overseas subsidiaries’ production. To keep pursuing cost leadership
strategies, Chinese MNEs had to gradually shift from home production to their
subsidiaries located at lower production sites in other developing countries due to
sharply increasing labor cost and location cost in China.
For example, we can look at the entry strategy of Haier, as it is a typical case
adequate to Rugman’s analytical framework.
In this case, most Chinese subsidiaries strengthened their cost leadership
derived from open module product specification combined with mass production
assembly lines which could be easily transferred from their home country.
In addition to this phenomenon, and even more noteworthy, are aggressive M&
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A strategies that have been continuously realized by Chinese MNEs targeting well
known developed country MNEs. As already described, in taking advantage of
acquiring the marketing skill and management know­how from developed country
MNEs, some Chinese MNEs have succeeded in unfolding a differentiation strategy
overlapped with customization. One common example is Lenovo, which ranks in the
top three in the world market share of personal computer (PC) after purchasing the
PC division of IBM for US$1.75 billion in December 2004 as part of its global
expansion plan (Cuervo­Cazurra, Newburry, and Park, 2016, p.84). Another is
Huawei Technology, which ranks third by world market share of mobile phone in
terms of international strategic alliances combined with internal R&D development.
In addition to these two giant MNEs, Haier is also noteworthy for completing
the acquisition of Sanyo’s white goods operations located in Japan in March 2012.
Prior to this acquisition, Haier had preferred keeping strategic alliance relationships
with Sanyo over acquiring Sanyo’s business divisions. By discerning several
strategic alliance entry modes, such as original equipment manufacturing (OEM),
joint R&D agreements, joint sales agreements and joint ventures (co­production) as
well as by Haier’s strategic motives and business objectives before absorbing
Sanyo’s white goods operations, Haier came to perfectly understand Sanyo’s
existing managerial resources and dynamic capabilities. When the stock price of
Sanyo plummeted due to a financial crisis based on Sanyo’s total debts (liabilities)
overshooting its capital, Haier made the decision to acquire Sanyo’s white goods
operations (a lot of information on the decision is derived from Nikkei Newspapers).
Since then, Haier has kept first place by world market share in the white home
appliances. The most successful factor for Haier results from adapting its portfolio
of offerings to its target markets. For example, Haier targeted a niche in the US
market, enabling the company to learn about the market and develop relationships
with major retailers (Khanna and Palepu, 2010, p.178).
The experience of TCL’s acquisition of Thomson of France is well known as
one of the most high­profile early emerging giant acquisitions of a developed
market­based firm. Consumer electronics firm TCL’s early globalization journey
was very similar to that of Haier (Khanna and Palepu, 2010, p.196). Comparing
both companies’ entry mode selections toward being giant MNEs is worthwhile in
the context of this study.
Both Haier and TCL expanded their target markets by applying a step­by­step
approach. In order to deeply satisfy the needs of existing and promising consumers
in the world and in terms of internal development, the first move has been the
selection of entry modes for reaching the target market. In the second phase, both
companies are used to concluding strategic alliance agreements. Recently,
acquisition has been selected as one of growth strategies.
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But now, all of the above four Chinese MNEs seem to be facing changes on
the part of foreign market entry strategies in response to fiercer world market
competition and the increasing commodity phenomena of the products sold.
Whether M&A is the best entry strategy should be examined.
V. Micro Analysis on Indian MNE
－Acquisition cases by Tata Steel Industry－
Tata Group is very well­known as India’s No. 1 conglomerate in the world of
business. Since the 20th century, Tata Group has challenged many M&A strategies
and has favored M&A as a global growth strategy in expanding its market share
inside developed countries.
For example, Tata Motors bought Daewoo Commercial Vehicle whose
headquarters was located in South Korea. British historical brands Jaguar and Land
Rover were also bought by Tata Motors. The aim of a series of acquisitions was to
expand the scope of the company and its subsidiary network to include a broader
range of car brand levels (Cuervo­Cazurra, Newburry, and Park, 2016, p.163).
Tata Chemicals acquired Brunner Mond, UK. Tata Tea absorbed Tetley, UK.
Tata Steel Industry (TSI) acquired Anglo­Dutch Corus Steel. Among others, the last
case is one of the biggest deals.
In this way Tata group appears to be good at acquiring manufacturers
stemming from the UK. Looking at the long history between the two countries in
trade affairs and the interexchange of human capital, M&A phenomena such as the
reverse relationship compared with the past history between the two countries might
be astonishing. In effect the phenomena should be fully convinced taking Tata
Group’s powerful managerial resources except for brand name into consideration.
According to Ramamurti and Singh (2009), Indian companies are inclined to
start with M&A from inside India, and then change the acquisition target to
companies from less developed countries. In the third stage, they move to focus on
acquiring companies from advanced countries as they have accumulated experience
of M&A. Such experiences cannot be neglected as learning outcomes result from
these experiences and such learning can be usefully deployed by the company
concerned in its pursuit of internationalization (Prashantham, 2015, p.54).
In the fourth stage, they come to have an orientation toward integrated M&A
whose targets are companies from developing and developed countries. In this way,
Indian MNEs prefer risk aversion to risk taking in doing M&A.
TSI is one case illustrating the above stage concept of M&A. Applying event
study to judging one of the successful cases for TSI after following the historical
process and finally testing the effects and causes of such an acquisition.
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The year 2007 is one of the most important milestones in the history of the
company, for three main reasons. The first is that August 2007 marked one hundred
years of its existence. The highest turnover and profits were seen in 2006­07, which
was a continuance of the trend of the past four years. Last but not the least, TSI
enhanced its presence on the international steel scene with the acquisition of the U.
K. based company, Corus Group pic. (hereafter, Corus).
Its strategic motive for acquisition was clear and its total business and financial
performances were very well, which might make TSI enough to embark lots of
money in the scheme of acquiring such a giant company as Corus.
In keeping with its vision of becoming a truly global player and creating a 50
million ton steel capacity company by 2015, TSI had been examining various
opportunities. The process started with the acquisition of Nat Steel Asia Pte. Ltd.
(Singapore) in 2005, and Tata Steel (Thailand) Public Co. Ltd. (erstwhile
Millennium Steel) in 2006, the planned brownfield expansion in Jamshedpur, and
the long­term greenfield projects in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand.
Why did TSI prefer acquisition to greenfield when aiming to enter the
European market?
Its abundant cash on hand and the enhancement of its own company name in
terms of acquiring worldwide manufacturers as well as its past successful history of
M&A should be kept in mind as the main reasons.
In October 2006, TSI submitted a bid to acquire Corus. The acquisition was
completed on 2nd April, 2007, at a price of 608 pence per ordinary share in cash
for a net consideration of US$ 12.9 billion. Corus is a leading steel company with
an annual crude steel production of 18.3 million tones and revenues of USD 19.2
billion in 2006. Corus operations are organized into three principal divisions; ①
Strip Products, ②Long Products and ③Distribution and Building Systems, with
manufacturing facilities located in the UK and the Netherlands. It holds strong
positions in the automotive, construction and packaging sectors in Europe.
The resulting Tata Steel Europe is Europe’s second largest steel producer. It
supplies steel and related services to the construction, automotive, packaging,
engineering and other sectors worldwide. It has major integrated steel plants in the
UK and the Netherlands, as well as a mini­mill operation in Rotherham. In the UK,
numerous downstream facilities, including rolling mills, tube mills and processing
and distribution centers are still operated still as well.
The series of three big international acquisitions realized by TSI within in only
two years fit “Integration type of M&A”, the fourth and final M&A stage for Indian
MNEs’ defined by Ramamurti and Singh (2009).
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Whether this acquisition was successful depends on the movement of TSI’s
stock price.
Before acquiring Corus, TSI absorbed Nat Steel Asia Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) in
2005 as described above. As Figure 1 shows, as soon as TSI completed the
acquisition of Nat Steel Asia Pte. Ltd., the stock price of TSI responded with a
sharp rise at once, thus demonstrating investor sentiment toward the large expansion
of its market share of all Asian steel and iron products. This acquisition is very
successful in that it increased the corporate value of TSI, accompanied with the rise
of its stock price in addition to extending the sales area in the Asian market.
In the second phase shown in Figure 1, the news that the total cost of US$
12.9 billion for obtaining Corus would have been paid by TSI’s take­over­bid
(TOB) was publicly reported. As soon as this kind of information permeated into
the public, the TSI stock price fell sharply because a variety of stockholders
released TSI shares out of fear that TSI’s financial conditions would deteriorate
because of the spending of a vast sum of its own money and long term debt, as is
often seen in M&A cases.
In the third phase in Figure 1, the stock price of TSI outstandingly rose to new
highs after completing the Corus purchase based on the general high expectations of
stockholders regarding the business performance of its post­merger integration (PMI)
Figure 1 Share price chart of Tata Steel Industry for event study
Source: from HP of TSI; Access date: 15 Sept. 2008.
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in Europe’s overall market.
This is an example of how event studies help us evaluate any result in the
aspects of both before and after a giant acquisition.
In reality the financial performance of TSI has been improving step by step
since PMI.
Nowadays, TSI is well­known as one of the world’s top class steel & iron
manufacturers, utilizing its firm’s own resources and taking advantage of outside
resources absorbed by M&A in a distinguished way.
Table 3 illustrates TSI’s financial performance from the third quarter in 2013 to
September in 2014 (concluding TSI’s financial statement).
2 April 2007 is the day on which TSI completed its acquisition and started
PMI, in which the integration of both businesses in the first and then their
organizational integration became recurrently an important task for TSI for the sake
of task force like PMI performed by TSI in a good manner,
Whether M&A has been successful for TSI is something to be evaluated in five
to ten years after the acquisition was completed.
By this criterion, September 2014 is the seven and a half year­mark for TSI
after finalizing the purchase of Corus, which is equal to an average time period,
which may be best timing for measuring and evaluating the effects of the
acquisition. In particular, TSI finished all of its depreciation of the goodwill fee
accrued within seven years, September 2014 is a good season for TSI, which is
shown by high business performance in Table 3.
Table 3 Financial Performance Analysis
9M FY’14 9M FY’13 HIGHLIGHT Q3 FT’14 Q2 FY’14 Q3 FY’13
18.94 17.57 Steel Deliveries (million tons) 6.38 6.48 5.83
1,06,186 1,00,061 Turnover 36,736 36,645 32,107
11,460 8,286 EBITDA 3,921 3,784 2,252
4,369 4,106 Depreciation 1,522 1,444 1,463
2,856 2,604 Net Finance Charges 1,001 976 964
4,286 1,443 PBT 1,395 1,398 −220
2,559 −529
Profit after Taxes Minority
Interest and Share of Associates
Basic and Diluted Earnings
503 917 −763
24.99 −6.84 per Share (Rs.) 4.73 8.98 −8.32
Note: Consolidated financial results summary (under Indian GAAP) for the nine months and third quarter
ended 31 December 2013. All figures in Rupees Crore, unless specified.
Source: Press release of Tata Steel in Tata home page.
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VI. Conclusions and Further Prospective
This paper intends to clarify the principle of strategic market entry mode
selections formulated by AEMM as their competitive positions opposed to MNEs
stemming from advanced countries became so upgrade that many American,
European and Japanese giant companies feel much fear that they must be compelled
to lose world market share. As a result of this in effect, many MNEs from
developed countries and their business divisions have been acquired by AEMM.
Against the background of the rivalry between these groups of companies, this
paper tried to perform a macro analysis on the determinants of FDI from AEMCs.
All four hypotheses are supported after testing them in terms of multiple regression
analysis. It is worth noting that export competitiveness is comprised of both national
strength and the firm’s, and this competitiveness is the necessary condition not only
for AEMCs but also for AEMM to continue increasing the stock of FDI. On the
other hand, domestic government expenditure is the sufficient condition for keeping
the above phenomenon. These results follow theoretical suggestions.
Turning to a micro analysis on the important factors which result in the success
of FDI including M&A, an analytical framework presented by Ruguman (2009,
p.51) is employed. The typical tendency for foreign direct investment inclusive of M
&A performed by Chinese MNEs is demonstrated. It becomes obvious that Chinese
MNEs attend to corporate weaknesses by gaining foreign companies’ strong
management and marketing know­how. This results in the success of M&A as one
of the most reliable market entry modes, because Chinese firms have rich financial
resources as a ­specific advantage unique to them can be vastly invested into the M
&A target. So long as we observe why Chinese manufacturers purchase the
divisions of overseas counterparts, most of these cases seem to follow the
conceptual and theoretical framework proposed by Rugman (2009).
When examining TSI’s acquisition of Corus, the event study shows a tendency
for TSI’s share price to shift as the market judged whether the series of TSI’s
acquisitions were proper and forecast to which direction TSI should turn its acquired
business. The financial report publicly announced by TSI was also appropriate to the
occasion for showing whether TSI’s PMI can succeed in expanding the existing
business fields and finding new customers as a result of acquiring Corus, in addition
to surveying if its TOB price was valid.
Specifically examining a few specific but salient acquisition cases decided upon
and executed by TSI was illustrative. In particular, the case of TSI’ Corus purchase
is specific as a successful case in terms of the strategic objectives defined by TSI
and its financial performance after its post­merger integration (PMI). TSI’s abundant
managerial resources including overseas M&A experiences accumulated by the past
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series of acquisitions might have effectively been helpful with supportive leveraging
effects on acquiring Corus. In this meaning, the stage approach, i.e. an incremental
approach for decision­making the target direction of M&A, which is developed by
Ramamurti and Singh (2009), can be applied to the acquisitions of Corus. That is
why TSI follows the suggestion derived from the above analytical framework.
In this manner, the theoretical suggestions are very useful for AEMM to take a
decision­making on FDI including M&A. This results in making managers
understood easily that each present and forthcoming business performance depends
on the appropriateness of a decision­making on M&A.
In the near future Asian MNEs except for Japan’s may surpass MNEs from the
US, EU and Japan. If then so, the former have a possibility of developing strong
firm­specific advantages such as innovative technology appropriate for novel
product development and more innovative production process which are difficult for
the latter to imitate. Depending on the possibility that these conditions come true,
the explanative power of the transaction cost approach (Rugman, 1981; Fujisawa,
2017) will be expected to be revived although its power for explaining the
determinants of FDI has been vanishing since the beginning of the 21st century,
because of augmenting strategic alliances as well as the appearance of emerging
MNEs.
As Casson (2018, p.25) implies, the contribution of The Future was not to
create a special theory of the MNE but rather to embed the MNE within a general
theory that would explain other things as well. And based on this thinking,
internalization which is mutually related with transaction costs is best understood as
a general organizing principle within a global economic system. Taking Casson’s
ideal toward the theoretical building of MNE into consideration, we have to address
the acquisition of a MNE from an advanced country by an emerging market country
­based MNE as substantial internalization vs. externalization from the theoretical
perspective and meaning as a future research agenda.
References quoted
Agtmael, A. V. (2007) The Emerging Markets Century: How a New Breed of World-Class
Companies is Overtaking the World, New York Free Press.
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. (1991) ‘Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed Countries:
Cultural and Economic Interactions’, in Buckley, P. J. and Clegg, J., eds. (1991) Multi-
national Enterprises in Less Developed Countries, Palgrave Macmillan.
Casson, M. (2018) The Multinational Enterprise: Theory and History, Edward Elgar.
Cuervo­Cazurra, A., Newburry, W. and Park, S. H. (2016) Emerging Market Multinationals,
Cambridge University Press.
Dunning, J. H., Kim, C. and Park, D. (2008) ‘Old Wine in New Bottles: A Comparison of
Takeshi FUJISAWA２８
Emerging­Market TNCs Today and Developed­Country TNCs Thirty Years Ago’ in
Sauvant K. ed. The Rise of Transnational Corporations from Emerging Markets: Threat or
Opportunity?, Edward Elgar.
Fujisawa,T. (2017) ‘Special Essay: The Switching Model of International Competitive and
Cooperative Entry Modes: Highlighting the Validity of a Revised Transaction Cost
Approach to the Theory of MNE’, JAPAN MNE Insights, Volume 3, Issue 2, February,
Academy of Multinational Enterprises (Japan), www.mne­jp.org.
Grätz, J. (2014) ‘Russia’s Multinationals: Network State Capitalism Goes Global’, in Nölke, A.
ed. (2014) Multinational Corporations from Emerging Markets: State Capitalism 3.0,
Palgrave Macmillan.
Khanna,T and Palepu, K. G. (2010) Winning in Emerging Markets, Harvard Business Press.
Lu, J., Liu, X. and Wang, H. (2010) ‘Motives for Outward FDI of Chinese Private Firms: Firm
Resouces, Industry Dynamics, and Government Policies’, Management and Organization
Review, 7(2), pp.223­248.
Nölke, A. (2014) ‘Private Chinese Multinationals and Long Shadow of the State’, in Nölke, A.
ed. (2014) Multinational Corporations from Emerging Markets: State Capitalism 3.0,
Palgrave Macmillan.
Prashantham, S. (2015) Born Globals, Networks and the Large Multinational Enterprise: Insight
from Bangalore and beyond, Routledge.
Ramamurti, R. & Singh, J. V. (2009) ‘Indian Multinationals, Generic Internationalization
Strategies’, in Ramamurti & R. & Singh, J. V., eds., Multinationals in Emerging Markets,
Cambridge University Press.
Rugman,A. (1981) Inside the Multinationals, Croom Helm.
Rugman, A. (2009) ‘Theoretical Aspects of MNEs from Emerging Economies’, in Ramamurti R.
& Singh, J. V., eds. Multinationals in Emerging Markets, Cambridge University Press.
Rugman, A. (2009) ed. New Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, Routledge.
The Entry Strategies of Asian Emerging Market Multinationals ２９
